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Part I – The Socratic Elenchus
“I found this [Socratic] method the safest for myself and very embarrassing to those against whom I used
it; therefore, I took delight in it, practiced it continually, and grew very artful and expert in drawing people, even of
superior knowledge, into concessions the consequences of which they did not foresee, entangling them in difficulties
out of which they could not extricate themselves, and so obtaining victory that neither myself nor my causes always
deserved.” – Benjamin Franklin, Papers1

What is the elenchus?
Consider this excerpt from Plato’s Euthyphro:
“Is the pious [itself] not the same and alike in every action? … Tell me then what this
form itself is, so that I may look upon it and, using it as a model, say that any action of
yours or another’s that is of that kind is pious, and if it is not that it is not.”2
Here, Socrates is interrogating Euthyphro, a self-reported religious expert, as to the nature of
piety. When Socrates first enquires as to what exactly “piety” is (notably a self-serving enquiry,
as Socrates is about to hear his own trial regarding his alleged impiety), Euthyphro quickly states
that piety is his imputation for his father’s wrongdoing. Socrates, however, is not very fond of
this response; in fact, he points out that Euthyphro’s response is indeed an example of piety, not
a definition; moreover, Euthyphro’s answer seems to be morally ambiguous (is it right to impute
your father?). The quotation above is Socrates’ follow-up—having claimed that certain acts can
be pious, Euthyphro has committed himself to believing that there is some sort of intrinsic
quality to these “pious actions”; Socrates now enquires as to this intrinsic quality (namely, “the
pious [itself]”), and Euthyphro is now forced to justify his claim and explicate this apparent
intrinsic quality.
This bit of text exemplifies what the Greeks called elenchus (Attic: ελεγχος – to
scrutinize, refute, or cross-examine), and what we now call the “Socratic method”. It is important
to note that Socrates was not the inventor of the elenchus, however—the honorary title is merely
1

Quotation pulled from Nails, Debra, "Socrates", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2010 Edition),
Ed. Edward N. Zalta. Emphasis placed by myself.
2
Plato. “Euthyphro”, Five Dialogues: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Phaedo. Trans. G.M.A. Grube.
Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981. pp. 6, 8

http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/puhistorian/vol6/iss1/4

2

Elliott: Nailing Down Arguments in Ancient Greece

due to Plato’s masterful rhetoric, as his dialogues characterize Socrates as the sine qua non for its
success. As it were, scholars do disagree on from whence this method came: Diogenes Laertius
claimed that it was first perfected by Protagoras, while Russell holds that Zeno was responsible
for first mastering the art.3 Regardless, we do have good reasons to believe that Socrates
certainly popularized this method of inquiry, and that he had been steeped in it since his youth.4
In any event, the elenchus is a method of inquiry which attempts to delineate the primary
assumptions behind one or more beliefs by means of raising questions that get at “what’s
behind” a claim. Thus, the elenchus is fundamentally dialectic in that it requires at least two
voices—an exponent (e.g., Euthyphro), who has the burden of proof given his or her assertion of
their knowledge regarding the quality under dispute (e.g., piety), and an examiner (e.g.,
Socrates), who attempts to tease out the exponent’s justification for his or her belief(s). In effect,
the elenchus is a method to analyze the claims of a person in such a fashion so that the exponent
either
(i)

realizes that his or her knowledge regarding the topic of interest is much less, or at
least more superficial, than he or she thinks it is (either by the examiner pointing
out logical inconsistencies, or contradictions),

or
(ii)

bites the bullet, as he or she can only sufficiently claim every single assumption,
assertion, or “brute fact” on which their knowledge is derived.5

As it turned out in most of the Socratic dialogues, the exponent ends up empty-handed,
confused, or bewildered at the end of the discussion—no matter what their outcome, be it (i) or
3

Russell, Bertrand. A History of Western Philosophy. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1972. p. 92
Ibid., In Plato’s Parmenides, Zeno questions the young Socrates via elenchus; indeed, this is mostly responsible for
Russell’s belief that the elenchus holds its roots in Zeno.
5
That is, it gets down to “I don’t know”, or “It just is that way”, both answers to unexplainable queries. Needless to
say, neither answer is too pleasing for either Socrates or his victim.
4
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(ii). This is either because Socrates showed that their logic is fallacious (i), or that their theory is
fundamentally inexplicable (ii). This method of refuting arguments, in many ways, is an ancient
form of what philosophers call a reductio ad absurdum—that is, “to reduce [some crucial part of
an argument] to absurdity”, thereby forming an objection to some argument in contention.
As it were, what at first seems to be a method of gaining knowledge (namely,
interrogating an expert) paradoxically turns out to be, in effect, a method of gaining ignorance;
which in turn feigns the epistemic superiority of the examiner (e.g., Socrates).6 It is indubitably
no coincidence that Socrates was known as the “gad fly” of Athens—he annoyed the well-to-be,
and amused the youth.7 Indeed, there is something counter-intuitive about “knowing more from
knowing less”, and it is this postulation which garners Socrates’ famous phrase, “I know that I
know nothing.”8 Moreover, it is this counter-intuition which irks Meno of Pharsalus into
postulating a devastating critique of Socrates’ epistemology, known now as “Meno’s paradox”.
However, before we gloss over what is wrong with the method of elenchus, let’s take a quick
look at its redeeming qualities.
The elenchus – Pros
One major pro for the elenchus is that it makes good prose—that is, it is a great literary device, a
form of dialogue, which can both suit to entertain and enlighten (two things which were Plato’s
“bread and butter”; in fact he was a great story teller and rhetorician, let alone an eminently
important philosopher). I think that this is perhaps the driving factor by which the elenchus
became so popular. Certainly dialogues have been used throughout history to flesh out
philosophical ideas (e.g., from the Socratic dialogues of Plato, to Hume, to Frege and Quine, and

6

W.K.C. Guthrie is famous for postulating this classic paradox in this manner. (See Nails, Op. Cit.)
We are also told that he was dirty, poor, and (assumingly) smelly. (Ibid.)
8
Chaerephon, a friend of Socrates, supposedly visited the Oracle of Delphi, who told him that Socrates was the
wisest man in Athens. This was Socrates’ response when he was told the news (according to Plato). (Ibid.)
7
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very recently Alter & Howell’s A Dialogue on Consciousness). In fact, their success owes both
to their approachability and explanatory power; in other words, being social creatures, there is
something very natural about learning via the flow of how ideas are represented in human
speech.9 Also, perhaps a more dubious reason dialogues are so powerful, the use dialogue can
easily pin the interlocutor against the author’s point of view, thus giving a philosopher ample
space to make his or her case, and in turn be more convincing.
Also, the Socratic method has been of substantial pragmatic use. For example, many
schools of pedagogy and therapy—such as the Harkness model and cognitive-behavioral
therapy—have been completely formulated out of the elenchus. That is, as students come vis-àvis with direct opposition, or at least vigorous examination, of their beliefs—and are moreover
challenged to defend their assertion—a sort of “intellectual housekeeping” has gone underway.
The same goes with cognitive-behavioral therapy; the more a patient critically analyzes their
beliefs, the more they are able to sort out between the various rational and irrational suppositions
from which their (harmful, or disordered) belief(s) are formed. Thus, perhaps the greatest use of
the elenchus is that it helps maintain consistency and holistic coherence to someone’s psyche. I
think that Socrates would admit to this claim himself, as he is well known for asserting that “the
unexamined life is not worth living”.10
However, as any post-20th century philosopher will tell you, there are simply many limits
on what propositional analysis de dicto (how it’s said—that is, in natural language) can get you
on matters of knowledge. As Russell states it, the elenchus is a useful form of enquiry for “that
which is logical and not factual.”11 This is perhaps a strange way of putting it, but essentially

9

I think this form is thus diametrically opposed to other “difficult” forms of doing philosophy, such as the
geometric/axiomatic form of Spinoza, or the hyper-categorical form of the scholastics (that is, the disputation).
10
Nails, Op. Cit.
11
Russell, Op. Cit., p. 93
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such critics are stating that the elenchus can only get at propositional truths—that is, the truth of
a belief, thought, or sentence—in the context to which they belong. This is why, for example, the
elenchus can shed light on the nature of the concept “piety”, or “justice”, because these are the
sort of entities that operate in the linguistic, or mental realm. Regardless, these sorts of things are
indeed relevant and important—they just are not the sort of entities which exhaust the forms of
human knowledge. Thus, we can safely say that the elenchus is an important way of knowing
certain things, but can hardly account for other forms of knowledge (such as empirical
knowledge). It is with this in mind that we will now turn to the cons of the elenchus.
The elenchus - Cons
Critics, like Bertrand Russell (to use a paradigmatic case), points out a very important
problem with the elenchus as a way of knowing; for instance, consider the aforementioned
complaint above. Granting that dialogue can only operate via the terms and conditions that one
already understands, the elenchus can help us gain knowledge in how to further clarify that
particular belief, term, or abstract concept under scrutiny. However, a concept which is
completely new to us, or external from our language (e.g., the discovery of quasars, or the
various formulae in quantum mechanics), is completely unobtainable via mere dialectic means.
Again, the elenchus is good for redacting truths which we already hold, but is ontologically
severed from the ability to broach mentally external truths. Another way of putting this is that it
must operate in the via negativa—that is, the elenchus cannot truly tell us what is fundamental to
the truth of a claim; rather, it can tell us what isn’t a fundamental truth of a claim.12
It is this exact problem which Meno illustrates in his famous paradox. One might state the
paradox as such: if one is ignorant in all ways of q (e.g., Socrates), he or she could never know q,
for they simply couldn’t recognize its q-ness by virtue of not knowing anything about q. Plato
12

Of course, this leads to more superficial problems with the elenchus—for example, it can become quite annoying.
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states it this way in the Meno: "And how will you inquire into a thing when you are wholly
ignorant of what it is? Even if you happen to bump right into it, how will you know it is the thing
you didn't know?"13 This is a serious problem for the elenchus and “Socratic ignorance”, and it
gets at the exact problem posed in the prior paragraph—in order to properly do elenchus, one can
only deduce new insights from a prior inclination, or “rudimentary concept”. In other words, if
Socrates truly has no inclination as to the nature of piety, then he will never be able to accept one
of Euthyphro’s formulations, as Socrates doesn’t have the rudimentary concept (of “piety”) with
which to align it. It is this rudimentary concept which the elenchus is unsuited to discover.
Hence, again, the elenchus helps us discern between already held beliefs (and from those
forming new ones), but it simply cannot bring wholly novel concepts to the table.
Of course, this is where Socrates (or really, Plato) first formulates the theory of
recollection, in attempting to prove that these “rudimentary concepts” are innate and preexisting. However, a sufficient analysis of this response is grossly beyond the means of this
paper. To succinctly explain the central problem with the recollection argument, however, is
simple: if Socrates didn’t lead the slave into his “grasping” of the axiomatic truths of geometry,
it is almost certain that the slave would have been unable to solve the geometrical problem, as he
simply wouldn’t know what the goal of the experiment was. It would be prima facie plausible to
argue that it is this fact which renders the slave’s “recollected knowledge”, or “rudimentary
concept” as based in evidential, or (more specifically), authoritarian knowledge.
Part II – The Aristotelian Syllogism and Inductive Method.
Aristotle’s legacy on Logic Proper and meta-metaphysical inquiry

13

Plato. “Meno”, Five Dialogues: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Phaedo. Trans. G.M.A. Grube. Indianapolis:
Hackett, 1981. p. 69
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When asked, “who has made the greatest contribution to the history of Western thought?”, there
are usually three possible answers: Plato, Aristotle, or Kant. Arguments and sentiments aside,
Aristotle’s philosophy has been, without a doubt, enormously influential in western thought—
indeed, many scholars have gone so far to say that Aristotle’s thought simply is Western
thought.14 That is to say, Aristotle’s Logic and Metaphysics has been in many ways the sine qua
non for most all of the Patristic ecclesiastical inquiry15, scholastic methods of learning16, and the
method of learning called empiricism (Aristotle called this episteme [Attic: ἐπιστήμη], the Latins
translated this into scientiae, and it is from this term we get the English term science17). Indeed,
it was the job of modern philosophy and science18 to “[gain] practically every advance… in the
teeth of the opposition to Aristotle’s disciples.”19 Thus, it is sufficient to say that Aristotle’s
influence—“greatest of all in [the field of] logic”20—has been tantamount to the entirety of
western thought. That is, for the first 2000 years of western philosophy, Aristotle was a “primary
source” of knowledge, and due to this fact, the last 500 or so years of enquiry has had to
juxtapose itself against (or at least in comparison to) him. This short discourse that follows will
gloss over two main ways in which Aristotle has influenced western thought—Logic Proper
(namely, the syllogism), and meta-metaphysics (namely, his use of both inductive and deductive
14

E.g., Thomas Aquinas, Rousseau, and modern scholars such as Patricia Curd
E.g., his work on universals, genera and species in the Categories is crucial to many early ecumenical creeds and
dogmatic formulations.
16
Namely, the disputation and the entire school of Thomism, which endures today (most notably through scholars
such as Bernard Lonergan and Robert Doran)
17
It is crucial to note that Aristotle did not call his method of learning “science” in the way we now think of it—
indeed, it was a necessary precursor to modern scientific inquiry, but he had a very different notion. Episteme, for
Aristotle, represented knowledge of the highest & most pure form, which includes a priori, a posteriori, deductive,
and inductive forms of knowing. It relates to modern scientific enquiry & Humean epistemology in that we should
discern primary truths inductively, that is, from analyzing the world around us and from such postulating a theory
that fits the data.
18
The traditional figure to point at as starting “modern philosophy”, is, of course, Rene Descartes, living some 2000
years later than Aristotle.
19
Russell, Op. Cit., p.202
20
Ibid., p. 195. I and presumably many others would dispute this—I think his metaphysics is, by and large, much
more influential, all things considered. It is important to remember that Russell was mainly interested in logic proper
(as opposed to natural metaphysics), and his sentiment clearly shows here in his text.
15
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methods in philosophy). As these are two monumental “prime movers” in the history of
philosophy, it is simply unrealistic to think that one could tackle most of the problems Aristotle’s
philosophy in this cursory a paper. Regardless, after examining the influence of both of these
forms of inquiry, discussing a few pertinent issues will be appropriate.
Logic Proper
Aristotle is an enormously influential figure in the history of philosophy in that he was truly the
first person to do formal logic. Granted, Aristotle’s formal logic—what we now call
propositional logic—is, after all, ancient. Formal logic has moved quite far and advanced quite a
bit since then (mainly due to such figures as Frege, Russell, and Whitehead et al.)—we can
loosely refer to a “modern” version as being predicate logic.21 In any event, propositional logic
was really the only way philosophers used logic until the modern era, and as such, Aristotle’s
account (proffered mostly in his Prior Analytics) dominated western philosophy for roughly
2000 years.
The central tenet to Aristotle’s logic is what is called the syllogism.22 A syllogism is a
simple argument, which grants a necessary conclusion (this necessity is why syllogisms are
intrinsically valid) from a major and a minor premise. The most basic of all the syllogisms is
called modus ponens:
1. P ⊃ Q
2. P
⊃Q

-- major premise --- minor premise --- conclusion --

1. All humans are mortal.
2. Socrates is a human.
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

There are a few other basic syllogisms (e.g., modus tollens, hypothetical syllogism, disjunctive
syllogism), and most other elaborate forms can be reduced down the basic four (what Aristotle

21

This is a vast oversimplification, but as we are looking here Aristotle & Russell simpliciter, I think the use of this
dichotomy is justified.
22
Russell, Op. Cit., p.196
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calls the “first figure”).23 Hence, Aristotle follows the Greek tradition in that his syllogisms are
deductive inferences—that is, they start with two propositions that hold truth values (namely, P
& Q), and proceed to garner new knowledge from those claims. It is for this reason that the
syllogism is called “propositional logic”—it can only operate on the level in which propositions
can be true or false (e.g., it relies on our assumption that “Socrates is a human” has a necessary
truth-value). As long as propositions one and two are true, then “logic grabs you by the throat”,
and the conclusion necessarily follows. It is indeed this reason that the syllogism is simply not fit
for many rigorous forms of argument.24 In any event, when one hears of how Aristotle’s work on
induction is tantamount to his logic, they are simply misconstruing logic with metaphysics—
Aristotle’s logic (that is, the syllogism, or “propositional logic”) is fundamentally deduction.
Induction is important, nonetheless, in Aristotle’s logic proper. For instance, the
deductive syllogism only works if we have good reasons to believe that the premises are, in fact,
true. It is this concern that Aristotle takes up in the Posterior Analytics, which will be looked at
in a bit in the discussion of Aristotle’s general influence on meta-metaphysics, grossly
concerning induction and deduction. So, one supposes first off that one could claim that this
reliance on induction within the syllogism is a “weakness” of some sort.
A more technical, and serious, problem arises in propositional logic, however. As an
exemplary critic again, Russell spells out three complaints to where this method “goes wrong”,
but for the sake of brevity, one will only discuss what seems to be the crucial flaw.25

23

Ibid.
That is, these are, broadly construed, the discrepancies of propositional logic which predicate logic obtains.
25
Russell, Op. Cit., pp. 197-199
24

http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/puhistorian/vol6/iss1/4

10

Elliott: Nailing Down Arguments in Ancient Greece

Essentially26, a proposition’s truth may come down to the fact that it is internally consistent, but
not true in our actual world. Consider the following syllogism:
1. ⊃x (Lsx ⊃ Sx)
2. ⊃x (Lsx ⊃ Lx)
⊃ ⊃x (Lx & Sx)

-- major premise -- 1. All samurai lobsters are samurais. (T)
-- minor premise -- 2. All samurai lobsters are lobsters. (T)
-- conclusion -Therefore, some (or, “at least one”) lobster(s) are samurai. (T?)

Clearly, the syllogism is valid (that is, its conclusion follows from the premises), and it is not at
all clear that the major and minor premises are false—after all, “samurai lobsters” would seem to
clearly be “lobsters”. The conclusion is clearly nonsense, however, and this is due to the key
weakness to the syllogism—properly speaking, many propositions cannot merely “be true”, full
stop. In essence, propositions can be true de dicto (in language), but false de re (in reality). That
is, implicit in premise one is that “if there were” samurai lobsters, “they would be lobsters”.
Properly speaking, you cannot do many arguments based on propositional truths, because it takes
more than internal consistency to make a proposition actually true, or true de re. Hence, any
modern philosopher does indeed seem to be “wasting their time” in working out complex proofs
with the syllogism—it plainly has some crucial internal flaws.27 Propositional logic can work
sometimes, but not all the time (or even most of the time).
Deduction and Induction, broadly construed – meta-metaphysics
In many ways, Aristotle deserves an epithet as the “father of empiricism”, or the “father of
science”. This is due to one fact: although Aristotle’s Logic Proper was centered on deduction, in
many ways Aristotle’s epistemology and metaphysics are fundamentally inductive (hence “metametaphysics). For instance, much of Aristotle’s metaphysics surrounds what we now call the
problem of universals. Simply put, the problem of universals enquires into the nature of such
26

Again, no pun intended. As my nomenclature has shown, the influence of Aristotle’s metaphysics reaches even so
far as our everyday English. Essentia and “prime mover” are both crucial—and original—concepts within
Aristotle’s metaphysics.
27
Russel, Op. Cit., p. 202
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terms as “humanity”, or “piety” (with reference back to the former essay—the elenchus mainly
focused on such universals). That is, are we to think of them deductively, explaining Aristotle’s
humanity in virtue of this universal, or are we to think of them inductively, explaining the
universal in virtue of Aristotle?28 At any rate, this metaphysical distinction is one main chasm
between the metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle (Plato preferring the former, Aristotle preferring
the latter). It is in this light that we may consider Aristotle’s work in induction to be tantamount.
Indeed, modern science, or empiricism, is indebted for Aristotle’s assumptions that the
point of interest in reality is grounded in particular instances of a type (say, Aristotle and the
President), and from the analysis of these two “things,” we can formulate a working theory of
what “humanity” is by what features they share. It is this metaphysical schema that Aristotle’s
Categories attempts to tease-out. In the end, Aristotle formulates a total of ten categories, or
“primary types.” It is superfluous to list them all here, but what is important to note is that there
are two fundamental sorts of categories for Aristotle: substance and accidents29. Essentially, we
can discern amid particulars (say, Aristotle) by analyzing their substance and accidents. Roughly
stated, the substance is the “thing itself”—or that subject which has properties, and the other nine
categories (the accidents) are types of properties. Hence, the substance Aristotle can be
predicated with various properties—the place he’s located, the quantity of his mass, the quality
of his features, etc. Finally, a last term worth noting is essence—a things essence is “those of its
properties which it cannot change without losing its identity.”30

28

It is in this manner that Aristotle formulates the concepts of genera and species (that is, Aristotle is a species of a
broader genera—humanity), the nomenclature of which clearly gets transcribed directly into biological taxonomy.
29
A modern term for “accidents” would be “properties”—for our purposes, let these two be synonymous,
30
Russell, Op. Cit., p. 200
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At any rate, it is this framework which comes into play in the Posterior Analytics—the
treatise in which Aristotle is primarily concerned with the metaphysics of grasping the truth of
propositions (by which the success of his syllogisms wholly depend) inductively. Again, this is
far too complicated to discuss at any length here, but it comes down to our a priori31 definitions
of terms as being essential to our understanding of the term (thus, he has turned Plato’s
recollection theory on its head, positing that we grasp general concepts via intricate mental
processes, based on human observation).
In the history of metaphysics, this answer to the problem of universals, fueled by an
intense reliance on inductive reasoning—would be able to be categorized as a type of realism. As
such, a sufficient discussion of the “problems”, or “objections” to this philosophy is well beyond
the means of this paper. One will end this discussion, however, with a general challenge to the
Aristotelian conception (one which gets at his argument in the Posterior Analytics), just to point
out its obvious drawbacks. Bundle theorists such as Russell (a type of realism-nominalism), for
example, have a threatening question to ask the Aristotelian: “can one actually imagine a subject
devoid of properties?” “What sort of thing could that even possibly be?” As you can see, the
Aristotelian is left with burden of proof.
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